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Abstract. Spread of computer viruses can be modeled as the SIS (susceptible-infected-susceptible) epidemic
propagation. We show that in order to ensure the random immunization or the targeted immunization
effectively prevent computer viruses propagation on homogeneous networks, we should install antivirus
programs in every computer node and frequently update those programs. This may produce large work
and cost to install and update antivirus programs. Then we propose a new policy called “network monitors”
to tackle this problem. In this policy, we only install and update antivirus programs for small number of
computer nodes, namely the “network monitors”. Further, the “network monitors” can monitor their
neighboring nodes’ behavior. This mechanism incur relative small cost to install and update antivirus
programs.We also indicate that the policy of the “network monitors” is efficient to protect the network’s
safety. Numerical simulations confirm our analysis.
PACS. 89.75.Hc Networks and genealogical trees – 05.70.Jk Critical point phenomena – 64.60.ah Perco-
lation
1 Introduction
One of key issues in the field of epidemiology is to
find effective strategies to prevent epidemic outbreaks. Re-
searchers widely studied immunization strategies in the
SIS (susceptible/infective/susceptible) model and the SIR
(susceptible/infective/removed) model. On some homoge-
neous networks, random immunization can be applied to
a e-mail: jhuang14@iit.edu
prevent epidemic propagation. It was confirmed by many
studies [1,2,3]. However, on heterogeneous networks just
like scale-free (SF) networks, random immunization me-
chanics is not particularly effective and we must intro-
duce other strategies to fight against epidemic. In order to
solve this problem, some researchers introduced optimal
immunization strategies such as the targeted immuniza-
tion strategy and the acquaintance immunization strategy.
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Relevant studies showed that these immunization strate-
gies are efficient on SF networks [2,3,4].
For the computer network, We often use the SIS model
to describe computer viruses spreading on networks. In
addition, relevant immunization strategies can be applied
to this model to prevent computer viruses spreading. In
this case, the situation that some computer recovers and
returns to the susceptible state can be regarded as the
fact that there is antivirus software in a computer node
and the computer can be “cured” by this software if it is
infected by computer viruses. However, if we want rel-
evant immunization strategies such as the random im-
munization and the targeted immunization to be effec-
tive on homogeneous networks, we must install antivirus
programs in each computer nodes and frequently update
those antivirus programs. Otherwise, random immuniza-
tion and targeted immunization may fail to prevent com-
puter viruses propagation. As a result, it may produces
large costs to install and update antivirus programs for
each computer and sometimes installing and frequently
updating every computer’s antivirus programs is even im-
possible. For instance, the university cannot ensure every
student’s computer or notebook in the campus network
possesses antivirus software. Consequently, it is meaning-
ful to find other efficient schemes that incurs relatively
low costs to install and update antivirus programs. In this
paper, we concentrate on this issue.
The paper is organized into following sections. In sec-
tion 2, we show that if we cannot install and frequently up-
date antivirus programs for every computer on the homo-
geneous networks, the random immunization strategy and
the targeted immunization strategy may fail to prevent
virus propagation. Then, we introduce “network monitor”
strategy to protect computer network’s safety and analyze
its efficiency on homogeneous networks. In section 3, we
concentrate on the issue of the effectiveness of the “net-
work monitor” strategy on SF networks. Finally, we give
discussion and conclusions.
2 Eradicating epidemics on homogeneous
networks
There are two classic ways to deal with problems of the
epidemic propagation. One way is based on the percolation
theory and techniques of generating functions [5,6,7,8]. In
fact, in the study of the resilience of the network [9,10,11,
12] this method was also widely used. The other way is
based on mean-field theory. In this paper, we mainly use
mean-field theory for analysis.
First, we show that random immunization is not effec-
tive to prevent computer viruses propagation if we cannot
install and update antivirus programs for each computer
nodes in the network. In the SIS model, computer nodes
are classified as susceptible nodes and infective nodes.
Each susceptible node is infected with rate λ provided that
it is connected with one or more infective nodes. Without
loss of generality, we also assume that infective nodes are
cured and become susceptible nodes with rate 1. Here,
infective nodes are “cured” by antivirus programs. For
simplicity, we concentrate on the WS network [13] with
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rewire probability 1, which has similar degree distribution
with the ER random graph model [14] and can be viewed
as a homogeneous network. Then the differential equation
of the SIS model is as follows:
dρ(t)
dt
= λ〈k〉ρ(t)[1 − ρ(t)]− ρ(t) (1)
Here, ρ(t) represents the density of infected nodes, 〈k〉 is
the average degree of a homogeneous network and λ is the
spreading rate. Suppose we can only install and update
antivirus programs for α (0 < α << 1) computer nodes
(α is the fraction of computer nodes). Then 1 − α com-
puter nodes cannot recover when they become infective.
In this case, Eq. (1) is not appropriate to describe prop-
agation behavior. The reason is as follows: the density of
ρ(t) is somewhat random density, then they may belong to
all 1 − α computer nodes, which means that they cannot
recover again. As a result, the second item on the right
of Eq. (1) is invalid. If 1 − α vertices on the network can-
not recover after they become infective, it is better to use
SI (susceptible/infective) model to describe virus propa-
gation behavior among those 1− α vertices. Without loss
of generality, we assume those α nodes are randomly cho-
sen from the WS network or the random network. Then
the subnetwork with 1−α nodes is also random network.
Thus, we can just consider the effectiveness of random
immunization with the SI model on the WS network with
rewire probability 1. The differential equation of the SI
model is as follows:
dρ(t)
dt
= λ〈k〉ρ(t)[1 − ρ(t)] (2)
If we apply random immunization, we can simply replace
λ by λ(1− g) where g represents the immunity. Then the
following differential equation can be obtained:
dρ(t)
dt
= λ(1 − g)〈k〉ρ(t)[1 − ρ(t)] (3)
After imposing the stationary condition dρ(t)dt = 0, we
have:
λ(1 − g)〈k〉ρ(t)[1− ρ(t)] = 0 (4)
The critical immunization can be obtained by letting Eq. (4)
only has one solution ρ(t) = 0. It can be fulfilled by forc-
ing ∆ = 0 where ∆ represents the discriminant of Eq. (4).
So the critical immunization gc = 1 when λ 6= 0. It shows
that random immunization is not effective.
We also conduct numerical simulation to test effective-
ness of the random immunization strategy. Besides ran-
dom immunization, we also test the effectiveness of the
targeted immunization on the WS network. The result can
be seen in Fig.1. In Fig.1 (a), the data of circles represent
the effectiveness of the random immunization. It can be
observed that nearly 0.8 computer nodes should be im-
munized in order to prevent the epidemic propagation. In
Fig.1 (b), the data of circles represent the effectiveness of
the targeted immunization on the WS network. We should
still immunize nearly the fraction of 0.65 nodes to prevent
virus propagation, which means targeted immunization is
still not efficient.
Consequently, if we want to efficiently prevent com-
puter virus propagation on homogeneous networks, we
should install and update antivirus programs for each com-
puter nodes on the network. Then the propagation behav-
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ior can be described by the SIS model. Relevant studies
indicated that random immunization and targeted immu-
nization are effective in this case [2].However, it can pro-
duce large cost and work to install and update antivirus
programs. In order to avoid this problem, we introduce a
new mechanism that can incur relatively small cost. We
call this new mechanism “network monitors”. Specifically,
we introduce two type “network monitors”. One is the
random “network monitors” and the other is the targeted
“network monitors”. The implementation of the random
“network monitors” is as follows: we randomly select some
nodes on the network as “network monitors”. These nodes
play two roles. On the one hand, they are immunized
nodes. In other words, we always update new version an-
tivirus programs and fire walls in “network monitors”. So
they cannot be infected by viruses. On the other hand,
“network monitors” can monitor their neighboring nodes.
If they find their neighbors infected by computer viruses,
they can “help” infected neighbors recover to the suscep-
tible nodes. In analysis, we assume that each susceptible
node is infected with rate λ and the infective nodes can
recover only by the help of “network monitors”.
Now, we analyze the efficiency of random “network
monitors”. Here, we use g to represent the density of “net-
work monitors”. Then we have the following mean-field
equation for the random “network monitors”:
dρ(t)
dt
= λ(1 − g)〈k〉ρ(t)[1 − ρ(t)]− f(〈k〉, g)ρ(t) (5)
In Eq. (5), f(〈k〉, g) =min(1, 〈k〉g) is the probability that
a given infected node connects with “network monitors”.
After imposing the stationary condition dρ(t)/dt = 0, we
can obtain the following quadratic equation of ρ(t) :
λ(1 − g)〈k〉ρ(t)2 + [f(〈k〉, g)− λ(1− g)〈k〉]ρ(t) = 0 (6)
ρ(t) = 0 is the solution of Eq. (6). If we want Eq. (6) to
only have this trivial solution, we need ∆ = 0. Then we
can get the critical density:
gc =


λ/(λ+ 1) f(〈k〉, gc) = 〈k〉gc
1− 1/(λ〈k〉) f(〈k〉, gc) = 1
So we can conclude that our random “network monitors”
can successfully suppress the epidemic outbreaks.
We also introduce the targeted “network monitors”. In
this mechanism, we choose those computer nodes with the
highest degree as “network monitors”. In order to test the
effectiveness of the targeted “network monitors”, we per-
form numerical simulations. Further, we also use numeri-
cal simulation to test the random “network monitors”.
Our simulations are as follows. In random “network
monitors”, we randomly choose some node to be infective
individual and randomly select nodes with density g as
“network monitors”. Then, if an infective node connects
to susceptible nodes, it infects each node with the rate λ.
As well, if an infective node is connected to one or more
“network monitors”, the infective node recovers to the sus-
ceptible node. Finally, when the density of infective nodes
does not change, our experiment ends. In the simulation
of the targeted “network monitors”, the only difference
from the random “network monitors” is that we initially
choose nodes with the highest degree as “network moni-
tors”. We perform simulations with 1000 different starting
configurations and with at least 10 different realizations
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of the network. Fig. 1 shows the result of our numerical
simulations.
In Fig.1 (a), the data of diamonds represent the ran-
dom “networkmonitors”. We observe that the critical den-
sity value g is near 0.5 for the random “network monitors”.
This confirms our analysis. Since we can get the critical
density of random “network monitors” when 〈k〉 = 8 and
λ = 0.25 in analysis, which is gc = 1 − 1/(λ〈k〉) = 0.5.
In Fig.1 (b), diamonds represent the data of the targeted
“network monitors”. we observe that the targeted “net-
work monitors” is still effective on the WS model.
3 Eradicating epidemics on SF networks
In this section, we focus on heterogeneous networks
especially on SF networks (we do not consider degree cor-
relations here). Firstly, we test whether the random “net-
work monitors” is effective or not on SF networks. We
write the mean-field rate equation as:
dρk(t)
dt
= λ(1− g)k(1− ρk(t))Θ(t) − f(k, g)ρk(t) (7)
Here, g represents the density of “network monitors” and
the function f(k, g) can be written as f(k, g) =min(1, k
∑
k′
k′p(k′)gk′/〈k〉), which is the probability that an in-
fected node with k links connects with some “network
monitor”. In addition, ρk(t) represents the density of in-
fected nodes that have degree k and we define the quan-
tity Θ(t) =
∑
k
kpkρk(t)/
∑
s
sps as the probability of the
susceptible node pointing to an infected node at time t.
In Eq. (7), we observe that if we can keep f(k, g) ≡ 1,
then the random “network monitors” is most efficient. It
(a)
(b)
Fig. 1. The relation of ρg/ρ0 and density g on the WS model
with N = 104, 〈k〉 = 8, P = 1, λ = 0.25 (a) circles rep-
resent the random immunization and diamonds represent the
random “network monitors”, (b) circles represent the targeted
immunization and diamonds represent the targeted “network
monitors”.
is apparent that if above condition is fulfilled, the effect
of random “network monitors” is equivalent to the effect
of random immunization strategy in the SIS model. From
Ref. [2] we know that this immunization strategy is not
particularly effective on SF networks in the SIS model.
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As a consequence, random “network monitors” is also not
effective on SF networks.
Next, we investigate whether the targeted “network
monitors” is effective or not on SF networks. After ap-
plying the targeted “network monitors”, we obtain the
following mean-field equation:
dρk(t)
dt
= λk(1− ρk(t)− gk)Θ(t)− f(k, g)ρk(t) (8)
In Eq. (8), gk represents the density of “network monitors”
with degree k and the function f(k, g) can be written as
f(k, g) =min(1, k
∑
k′
k′p(k′)gk′/〈k〉). Here we assume that
after applying the targeted “network monitors”, the prob-
ability that a node with k links is healthy is (1−ρk(t)−gk).
In the stationary state (dρk(t)/dt = 0) we obtain Eq. (9)
from Eq. (8):
λk(1 − ρk − gk)Θ = f(k, g)ρk (9)
From Eq. (9) we can get the solution of ρk(t) in the sta-
tionary state: ρk = ((1 − gk)λkΘ)/(f(k, g) + λkΘ). Now
inserting this result into the definition of Θ, we can obtain
Eq. (10):
Θ =
1
〈k〉
∑
k
kp(k)
(1− gk)λkΘ
f(k, g) + λkΘ
(10)
Here, we define an auxiliary function
F (Θ) =
1
〈k〉
∑
k
kp(k)
(1 − gk)λkΘ
f(k, g) + λkΘ
−Θ
It is apparent that F (0) = 0. Since 1〈k〉
∑
k
kp(k) (1−gk)λkΘ
f(k,g)+λkΘ ≤
1
〈k〉
∑
k
kp(k) (1−gk)λkΘ
λkΘ
< 1, we have F (1) < 0. If F ′(0) < 0,
then F (Θ) < 0 for some Θ ∈ (0, 1]. But if F ′(0) ≥ 0,
there is a Θ1 ∈ (0, 1) that satisfies F (Θ1) > 0. Then by
the intermediate theorem, there is a Θ ∈ (Θ1, 1) satisfies
F (Θ) = 0. Consequently, if there is a Θ ∈ (0, 1) that sat-
isfies F (Θ) = 0, F ′(0) ≥ 0. It is equivalent to say that if
there is a non-zero solution of Eq. (10), then:
d
dΘ
(
1
〈k〉
∑
k
kp(k)
(1− gk)λkΘ
f(k, g) + λkΘ
) |Θ=0≥ 1 (11)
So we can get Eq. (12):
λ
〈k〉
∑
k
k2(1− gk)p(k)
f(k, gc)
= 1 (12)
Here gc represents critical density of “network monitors”.
We define a new quantity kt. When k > kt the density of
“network monitors” gk = 1 and when k ≤ kt the density
of “network monitors” gk = 0. So we rewrite Eq. (12) as
follows:
λ
〈k〉
kt∑
k=0
k2p(k)
f(k, gc)
= 1 (13)
From the definition of kt we can get gc =
∑
k>kt
p(k) ≈
1 −
∫ kt
0 p(k)dk. Then we can obtain the expression of kt
as a function of gc. Finally, we insert this expression into
Eq. (13) to get the critical density gc.
In order to support our analysis, we perform numerical
simulations on the BA network [17] with the network size
N = 104, m0 = 7, m = 4 and λ = 0.25. Initially, we infect
only one node.
Fig. 2 shows the relation between reduced density of
infected nodes ρg/ρ0 in the end and the density of “net-
work monitors” g. In Fig. 2, circles represent the data of
the random “network monitors”. We observe that the ran-
dom “network monitors” is not particularly effective. We
should immunize large proportion of nodes as monitors
to eradicate infection. On the contrary, we find that the
targeted “network monitors” is effective. This fact can be
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Fig. 2. The relation of ρg/ρ0 and density g on the BA model
with N = 104, m0 = 7, m = 4, λ = 0.25. Circles represent the
strategy of random “network monitors” and diamonds repre-
sent the strategy of targeted “network monitors”.
observed in Fig. 2, in which the critical density of “net-
work monitors” gc ≈ 0.15.
4 Discussion and conclusions
The main conclusion can be summarized as follows:
1. If we can only install and update the antivirus programs
with the fraction α (0 < α << 1) computer nodes on the
network, the random immunization and the targeted im-
munization are not efficient to prevent computer viruses
spreading on the homogeneous networks.
2. We introduce a policy to protect the computer net-
works, namely, “networkmonitors”. Specifically, we choose
some computer nodes on the network as the “network
monitors”. They play two roles. On the one hand, They
are immune to computer viruses. On the other hand, “net-
work monitors” can monitor their neighboring nodes’ be-
haviors. If they find their neighbors infected by computer
viruses, they can eliminate computer viruses from infected
neighbors. Based on different approach to select nodes as
the “network monitors”, we divide the “network moni-
tors” into two types, one is the random “network moni-
tors” and the other is the targeted “network monitors”.
Through analysis, we find that the random “network mon-
itors” and the targeted “network monitors” are effective
on WS networks. Besides, the targeted “network moni-
tors” is effective on SF networks. Numerical simulations
confirm our analysis.
In fact, our new strategy is similar with the contact
tracing [18] but we explicitly set monitors on the network.
If possible, we can initially install antivirus programs in
each computer node on the network and then only up-
date antivirus programs in “network monitors” . So the
recovering probability of the infective computer node is
generally not zero, since old version antivirus programs
can “kill” ordinary viruses. Then the number of “network
monitors” chosen to eradicate computer viruses is smaller
than our analysis. It demonstrates that the strategy of the
“network monitors” is practical and efficient that we need
only update small fraction computers’ antivirus programs
and fire walls so that the security of the whole computer
network can be kept.
The author thanks Robert Ellis, Hemanshu Kaul and
Michael Pelsmajer for meaningful comments.
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